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1 Introduction
Many malware authors borrow source code from other authors when creating new malware, or
will take an existing piece of malware and modify it for their needs. As a result, malware within a
family of malware (i.e., malware that is closely related in function and structure) often exhibit strong
parent–child relationships. Determining the nature of these relationships within a family of malware
can be a powerful tool for cyber–defense.
Generating the lineage of a family of malware is thus an important task but is difficult to perform
manually due to the sheer volume of malware, intentional obfuscation by malware authors, and
the many features and subtleties that must be examined to determine parent–child relationships. In
this work, we describe a novel method for generating the lineage of a large family of obfuscated
malware. We formulate the problem as a generative probabilistic model and develop a probabilistic
programming (PP) algorithm to learn and infer the temporal and structural organization of a family’s
lineage. We demonstrated the accuracy and validity of our approach on synthetic data and real lab–
generated malware. This work has significant implications in the cyber–defense community, and
presents a problem that would be difficult to solve without the benefits of PP.
2 Lineage as a Probabilistic Model
The lineage of a set of malware binaries is a directed graph, where the nodes are the set of binaries
in the family, and an edge from binary A to B implies that binary B evolved partly from A (and
by implication, was created at a later time). The lineage can have multiple roots and binaries that
contain multiple parents. By the definition of lineages, it is essential to know the order in which
binaries were created. Without this information, it would be difficult to determine the inheritance
direction of any parent–child relationships As such, the lineage of a set of binaries (i.e., the graph)
is conditioned upon the the creation times of each of the binaries. We initially represent this simple
relationship as high–level probabilistic model.
The Lineage variable represents a distribution over the possible lineages that can be constructed from
a set of binaries, conditioned upon the Creation Times and the Malware Features. The Creation
Times represents a distribution over the creation times of each binary and Malware Features is a
deterministic variable that constrains the lineage generation based on binary similarity. The more
features that malware binaries share, the more likely they are connected in the lineage, but the actual
parent–child assignment of the two nodes depends upon the given creation times. Lineage on a set
of malwareM is then defined as
LineageM = argmax
LineageM,i
P (LineageM,i|FeaturesM, T imesM) (1)
Computing Eqn. 1 on a set of malware is often difficult because the compiler time stamp is often
purposely obfuscated by the author, so the creation times must be inferred using any available infor-
mation, either from within a binary or using external information. Fortunately, we can also use the
date that malware was first encountered in the wild as additional evidence.
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(a) Plate for the model of each binary’s creation time to infer a
lineage–independent distribution of its creation time using time
stamp and time seen as evidence.
(b) Lineage model given distributions of the creation times of
each malware. The malware features are used as soft constraints
on the inheritence relationships.
Figure 1: Probabilistic models of lineage
One of the key insights is that the lineage and creation times are joint processes that can inform each
other; knowing the lineage can improve inference of the creation times, and vice–versa. As such,
performing joint inference of these models can potentially produce better results than inferring the
creation times first and conditioning the lineage on the most likely creation times.
2.1 Creation Time Model
The plate for the creation time model is shown in Fig. 1(a). For a set of N binaries, we instantiate
N independent models. While the binary creation times are not truly independent, the dependence
between the creation times of different binaries is enforced through a joint inference algorithm,
detailed in subsequent sections.
Each probabilistic model contains five variables. First, there is a variable to represent the actual bi-
nary creation time. There is also a variable to represent the time the binary was first seen in the wild.
There is also a variable to represent the time stamp of the binary (from the actual binary header).
This variable depends upon the creation time, as well as two additional variables that represent any
obfuscation by the malware author to hide the actual creation time; one variable determines if the
time stamp is obfuscated, and the other represents how the time stamp is obfuscated (either empty or
some random value). Evidence is posted to the time seen and time stamp variables and a distribution
of each malware’s creation time can be inferred. Note that the priors for the obfuscation variables
and parameters for the conditional distributions can be learned.
2.1.1 Lineage Model
The model for lineage is shown in Fig. 1(b). For each malware binary, we create a set of variables
that represent how the binary can be used in the lineage. First, there is a variable which repre-
sents the possible existence of edges between a binary i and all the other binaries. This variable is
deterministic conditioned upon the creation times of all the binaries
There are also two variables that control the number of edges (i.e., parents) for each binary, as well
as a variable that specifies whether a particular binary is a root in the lineage. Finally, there is a
variable that represents a set of actual lineage edges of a binary i which depends upon the possible
edges of the binary, the number of edges it has, and whether it is a root binary. By definition, the
values of the actual edges variable for all binaries defines the lineage over the set of malware (i.e., it
can be deterministically constructed from the edges and the creation times.)
The conditional probability distribution of the actual edges variable is constrained by the difference
between the features of the binaries. That is, the higher similarity between two binaries, the more
likely they are to have an edge between them. The similarity measure between binaries is based on
binary similarity measures and we refer the reader to [3] for more details.
3 Inference Algorithm
As shown in Eqn. 1, the lineage is the maximal probability lineage given the creation times and the
malware features. Since the creation times are unknown, we must infer both the lineage and the
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(a) Reduction in Error after Lineage.
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(b) Results of the lineage estimation on the MITLL data.
Figure 2: Testing results
creation times jointly. To accomplish this, we employed an iterative algorithm to jointly infer the
most likely binary creation times and lineage, outlined as follows:
1. Infer a distribution of the binary creation times. Using the observable time stamp and
time seen information, we infer a distribution of the creation times of each binary. This
distribution is still conditioned upon the lineage; this process marginalizes out some of the
information not needed to compute a lineage.
2. Sample the creation times. We take a sample from the creation time distributions of the
malware binaries. This creates a fixed order of the binaries.
3. Infer the most likely lineage. We infer the most likely lineage of the malware binaries
given the fixed creation times. That is, we compute the lineage described in Eqn. 1.
4. Infer the most likely creation times. The most likely creation times is defined as the set
of creation times that maximizes the probability of the creation times conditioned on the
features and the current lineage. Since we are conditioning on the previously computed
lineage, we fix the inheritance between two binaries, but the direction of the edge can
change depending on the inferred creation times.
5. Repeat steps 3–4 until convergence. We repeat the process until convergence.
6. Repeat steps 2–5 until enough samples have been collected. Since there is no guarantee
that the maximization process converges on the global maximum, we restart the process to
increase the likelihood that the global maximum is reached.
The algorithm is very similar to the expectation–maximization algorithm [2], but we must re–sample
several initial malware creation times to ensure that we are finding a satisfactory maximum value.
At the end of the algorithm, we select the lineage with the highest probability (from the multiple
restarts of the algorithm) as the lineage of the set of malware.
4 Implementation and Testing
We implemented the model in Figaro [5], an open–source PP language, which provided several
benefits on this problem. First, many of the model structures are repeated, so Figaro’s object–
oriented nature facilitated easy creation and reuse of these structures. Second, Figaro is a natural
environment to create the iterative maximization algorithm; Figaro’s inference engine can reason on
any model encoded in the language, so it is easy apply successive maximization algorithms to the
model. Finally, Figaro has several built in algorithms for learning and maximization, allowing us to
focus on the model representation and not on the inference.
Inferring the creation times depends upon variable parameters which are generally unknown. For
instance, we need to know the prior probability that a binary’s time stamp has been obfuscated. To
determine these parameters, we learn them on a training set of data. Standard Bayesian machine
learning methods can be used to learn the parameters, and we omit details for brevity.
Maximization in the iterative algorithm used Simulated Annealing to compute the most likely values
for both the creation times and lineages. The Metropolis–Hastings [4] algorithm was used to infer
the distribution of creation times for the binaries.
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We tested the lineage method on both synthetic data and real malware generated by MIT Lincoln
Lab (MITLL) as part of the DARPA Cyber Genome effort [1]. The synthetic data was primarily
used to compute the accuracy of the creation time learning and estimation, and our results showed
that our probabilistic model is an effective means to capture this information. More importantly,
we also used the synthetic data to verify if the iterative algorithm can improve the creation time
estimation (i.e., is there benefit to joint inference). In Fig. 2(a) we show the reduction in the creation
time error (expected creation time compared to real creation time) after lineage is performed, where
we varied the obfuscation of the malware time stamps from 0% to 100%. As can be seen, on all but
one of tests, our estimate of the creation times improves after the iterative lineage algorithm has run,
demonstrating the value of joint inference on this problem.
We tested the lineage estimation algorithm on 17 lineages generated by MITLL. Fig. 2(b) the accu-
racy of the lineage algorithm on four metrics. We show the results of lineage generation on the same
17 families using our original implementation that did not use PP or joint inference (it computed lin-
eage using a single estimate of the creation time). As can be seen, our lineage estimation algorithm
can reconstruct lineages of malware with fairly high accuracy, and is a significant improvement over
the non–PP solution. These results demonstrate that our probabilistic formulation of the lineage
problem is an effective solution to construct lineages in light of uncertain and obfuscated data.
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